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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

FEDERAL REGULATION AND THE PROBLEM OF
ADJUDICATION©

MARCIA L. MCCORMICK*
ABSTRACT
After decades of deregulation, the United States seems to be entering a
period of re-regulation, regulation to prevent harm that many activities might
cause and also to create positive external benefits that those activities could
yield, but might not without incentives. Most regulatory programs in the
United States provide a blend of measures designed to create these positive
external benefits, promote good practices in the industry, prevent harms, and
provide those harmed with remedies. At a time in which we contemplate new
ways to regulate to deal with the crises of the day and prevent the crises of
tomorrow, this Article seeks to explore one piece of the solution, a piece not
usually thought of as regulatory: adjudication. Adjudication is often part of a
broader regulatory web and is used both to deter harmful behavior and to
remedy harmful behavior engaged in. And it is used in a variety of contexts.
To explore how we might construct federal agencies with greater
adjudicatory power, I will use the regulation of equal employment opportunity
as a case study. This Article analyzes the limits Article III may place on the
structure of adjudicating agencies and ways those limits might be overcome. It
then explains the weaknesses of the current system to enforce the
antidiscrimination laws and outlines a proposal for what an adjudicative
agency designed to maximize the benefits from an agency perspective might
look like.
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INTRODUCTION
Calls for increased regulation are flying fast and furious these days. They
are spurred by crises over the last couple of years in a relatively broad range of
areas from the financial crisis, to tainted food, to defective consumer products,
to consumer and worker exploitation, along with the looming new challenges
like averting the worst consequences of global climate change, controlling the
rise in healthcare costs, or protecting worker retirement plans as the workforce
grows lopsidedly older.1 Regulatory reform even has significant pop culture

1. See, for example, the widespread outbreak of E-Coli from tainted peanuts, which led to a
call for increased regulation of food safety, PBS NewsHour: Salmonella-Tainted Peanut Butter
Raises Wider Health Concerns for FDA (PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2009), (transcript
available at http://www.pbs.org/newshour/bb/health/jan-june09/salmonella_01-23.html), and the
hearings on safety problems with Toyota cars, Micheline Maynard, U.S. Studies A Backup For
Brakes, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 2010, at B1 (reporting that at least one senator criticized the
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration for having failed to act). Similarly, some
have suggested that lack of regulation, or at least a lack of action by regulators, was responsible
for the crash of the mortgage market and subsequent financial crisis from late 2007 to the present.
See Richard A. Posner, Op-Ed, Our Crisis of Regulation, N.Y. TIMES, June 25, 2009, at A23
(suggesting that regulators of the markets and banking industries “were asleep at the switch”);
Catherine Rampell, Lax Oversight Caused Crisis, Bernanke Says, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 4, 2010, at
A1; Nelson D. Schwartz & Floyd Norris, Reluctant Eye over Wall St., N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 30,
2008, at A1 (reporting on responses to allegations of regulatory failure).
And the Obama administration has proposed both regulatory changes in existing
agencies, and also entirely new agencies. See, e.g., David Stout & Stephen Labaton, Vote Backs a
Financial Oversight Body, N. Y. TIMES, Oct. 23, 2009, at B3 (describing a bill to create a new
consumer financial protection agency as well as changes to existing law to strengthen regulation
of banks and trade in derivatives); Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Labor, U.S. Labor Department
Rules To Improve Retirement Security Announced As Part of White House Middle Class Task
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caché. The comedy website Funny or Die and actors from Saturday Night Live
who had all played presidents during those presidents’ administrations
produced a video for The Main Street Brigade, a political consumer protection
organization, in which former presidents urged President Obama to push for
the Consumer Financial Protection Agency.2 New agencies are rarely the stuff
of sketch comedy. Meanwhile, in the background, scholars continue to study
ways to regulate better and minimize any inappropriate interference with the
market and with individual liberty, while promoting good policy and averting
the disasters a lack of regulation can cause.
We use regulation in the United States to prevent harm that various kinds
of activities might cause and also to create positive external benefits that those
activities could yield, but might not without incentives. For example, we
regulate the production of goods to prevent harm to the environment caused by
the processes of production, to prevent harm to the consumers of those goods
that use might cause, and to protect the health and safety of the workers who
produce those goods.3 We also regulate the production of goods to promote
distribution of the benefits that flow from their production and to distribute
benefits the government might have to supply instead.4 So we regulate the
number of hours a person can work and set a minimum level of pay.5 We also
regulate the ways in which companies that produce goods interact with their

Force’s Year-End Report (Feb. 26, 2010), http://www.dol.gov/opa/media/press/ebsa/EBSA
20100251.htm (describing proposals to increase regulation of employee retirement plans); Press
Release, White House, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the President on House
Passage of the Health Insurance Industry Fair Competition Act (Feb. 24, 2010), http://www.white
house.gov/the-press-office/statement-president-house-passage-health-insurance-industry-fair-com
petition-act (concerning legislation to regulate the business of health insurance); Commerce
Department Proposes Establishment of NOAA Climate Service, NAT’L OCEANIC &
ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN. (Feb. 8, 2010), http://www.noaanews.noaa.gov/stories2010/20100208_
climate.html (describing the establishment of a new National Oceanic and Atmospheric
Administration office to provide climate information for individuals, businesses, and
communities).
And while I was writing this article, two massive reforms became law. Dodd-Frank
Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010);
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010), amended
by Health Care and Education Affordability Reconciliation Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-152,
124 Stat. 1029.
2. Funny or Die’s Presidential Reunion, FUNNY OR DIE, http://www.funnyordie.com/vide
os/f5a57185bd/funny-or-die-s-presidential-reunion (last visited Oct. 11, 2011).
3. See 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006) (stating that the conditions causing Congress to enact the
Toxic Substances Control Act included humans’ and the environment’s exposure to chemical
substances and the dangers in producing such chemicals).
4. See 29 U.S.C. § 202 (2006) (stating that Congress found, in enacting the Fair Labor
Standards Act, that minimum labor conditions were necessary to maintain the “minimum
standard of living necessary for health, efficiency, and general well-being of workers”).
5. See id. §§ 206–07.
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employees in a way that allows the employees to band together to better their
working conditions and pay and to bring in more workers to receive the same
benefits.6 Finally, we provide incentives for those companies to compensate
employees in ways that promote their health (by providing health insurance),
guard against wage loss that might come with an inability to work (by
providing disability insurance), and save for retirement.7
Most regulatory programs in the United States provide a blend of measures
designed to create these positive external benefits, promote good practices in
the industry, prevent harms, and provide those harmed with remedies. At a
time in which we contemplate new ways to regulate to deal with the crises of
the day and prevent the crises of tomorrow, this Article seeks to explore one
piece of the regulatory solution: adjudication. Adjudication is used both to
deter harmful behavior and to remedy harmful behavior engaged in. And it is
used in a variety of contexts.
The traditional method of adjudication, using courts and the formal trial
process, is rather expensive, which is one of the reasons that adjudication
works as a deterrent. But that expense means that using this aspect of
regulation will be less attractive. Still, it need not be. Much of our federal
regulation is done by administrative agencies, created to develop expertise in
the area being regulated, to regulate more effectively, and to regulate in a more
cost-effective manner. Agencies could perform the adjudicatory function of
regulation.
Several agencies do perform adjudicatory functions, but adjudication by
agencies has not been adopted wholesale for every area of regulation because
of separation of powers concerns. The Constitution places the judicial power
of the United States in the judicial branch and requires that those who exercise
the judicial power be given life tenure and salary protection.8 Thus, while
Congress has the power to create agencies to enforce the laws,9 it may not have
power to vest those agencies with the judicial power of the United States
unless the adjudicators have life tenure and salary protection.10 So to the

6. See National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151–69 (2006).
7. We create incentives through the federal tax code, for example. Health insurance
premiums are not taxed to the employee but are deductible by the employer as a business
expense. They are essentially a form of tax-free compensation. Retirement benefits are not taxed
to the employee until the employee draws on the funds, but they are deductible to the employer
immediately. For a description of this tax system, see S. REP. NO. 110-667, at 737–88, 865–89
(2008).
8. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
9. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 9; id. art. III, § 1.
10. ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 223 (5th ed. 2007); see also N. Pipeline
Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59, 60, 87 (1982) (finding the bankruptcy
court unconstitutional because judges without life tenure had jurisdiction over inherently judicial
matters without adequate supervision of Article III judges).
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extent that regulation through adjudication would require an exercise of the
judicial power of the United States, we may need to tread carefully.
To explore how we might construct agencies with greater adjudicatory
power, I will use the regulation of equal employment opportunity as a case
study. As a preliminary matter, I recognize that we don’t usually talk about
equal employment opportunity as something to be regulated. Instead, we use
the language of rights. But this is an area in which we have used law
instrumentally to change broader social norms and it focuses on how
businesses operate. Making rules for the conduct of commercial activity is
regulation, and so regulation seems an apt description of the process that we
are using to prevent the harm of discrimination and to remedy the harm
discrimination causes.
The regulation of employment discrimination makes a good case study for
one more reason. Employment discrimination laws in the United States have
not created full equality in the workplace, and, in fact, progress on that front is
viewed by many as having stalled, which makes it ripe for regulatory reform.
If the rules we have are not working, we need to revisit those rules. The
federal government, particularly the legislative and executive branches, needs
to take a more active role to vindicate the public interest, create accountability,
and help promote equality in the private sector. Agency adjudication could be
one tool to accomplish these goals, and it could also be used in other areas to
accomplish similar goals. Thus, analyzing this area will tell us important
things about the application of agency adjudication in other contexts as well.
I will begin the exploration of the problem of agency adjudication by
laying out the limits Article III may place on the structure of adjudicating
agencies. Then, in Part II, I will explain a bit more fully the weaknesses of the
current system to enforce the antidiscrimination laws. That section will outline
my proposal for what an adjudicative agency designed to maximize the
benefits of adjudication from an agency perspective would look like. Part III
will then discuss ways that the agency could be designed to minimize the
constitutional objections while maximizing the benefits that agency
adjudication is harnessed for.
I. ARTICLE III AND AGENCY DESIGN
One reason that agency adjudication is used in only limited circumstances
in the federal system is that the Constitution appears to limit the adjudicative
function to judges who have life tenure and salary protection. The Constitution
states,
The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court,
and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and
establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their
Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their
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Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
11
Continuance in Office.

While this language might suggest that judicial power cannot be exercised at
all by a tribunal whose judges lack life tenure and salary protections,12
Congress has created tribunals staffed by judges without those protections
since the earliest days of this country.13 The Supreme Court has validated the
use of these legislative courts almost as long as they have existed.14 And most
scholars agree that we could not now adopt any sort of literalist interpretation
of this language.15
One of the reasons that such an adoption would be impossible is that there
is no bright line between adjudication of legal disputes and enforcement of the
law. An adjudication could be described as the application of law to facts in a
way that binds an individual with an interest at stake. But most enforcement of
the law or legislative enactment requires similar application of law and policy
to facts in a way that binds individuals with an interest at stake.16 While some
actions are easy to identify as judicial, executive, or legislative, trying to
articulate that difference clearly as a functional matter can be very difficult.
Take for example a decision about who should get welfare benefits. Is the
decision about who is entitled to them a legislative, judicial, or executive
decision? You might say that the initial rules, the decision about whether to
provide benefits at all or who generally should be entitled to benefits, are
purely a policy choice and legislative. Then a decision about whether a
particular person meets those criteria, the application of the criteria to a
specific instance, is adjudicative. But that application might just as easily be
considered executive—a process necessary to the execution of the program. It
might even still be seen as legislative in the sense that the ultimate question is
whether the legislature intended that this person be entitled to benefits under
these circumstances.

11. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
12. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 223.
13. Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Of Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and Article III,
101 HARV. L. REV. 915, 919–20 (1988).
14. See Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 546 (1828) (holding
constitutional the use of legislative courts).
15. See, e.g., Paul M. Bator, The Constitution as Architecture: Legislative and
Administrative Courts Under Article III, 65 IND. L.J. 233, 239 (1990); Fallon, supra note 13, at
916, 919.
16. See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill, Beyond Powers and Branches in Separation of Powers
Law, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 603, 618–19 (2001); Caleb Nelson, Adjudication in the Political
Branches, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 559, 561 (2007); V. F. Nourse, Toward a New Constitutional
Anatomy, 56 STAN. L. REV. 835, 859 (2004); David Orentlicher, Conflicts of Interest and the
Constitution, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 713, 726–27 (2002).
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The difficulty of distinguishing among the judicial, legislative, and
executive powers ensures that no rigid rule can be articulated to describe with
precision what matters must, as a constitutional matter, be determined by the
judicial branch. While in principle we describe the separation of powers as if
there is a distinct line around the functions of each branch, in practice, that line
is fuzzy, at best. The more federal regulation we have, the fuzzier the lines get.
And so Congress has created and the Supreme Court has approved the use
of legislative courts in several areas. For the most part, their constitutionality
depends on either a category of historical use, or the nature or source of the
interest at stake and the level of control by an Article III court.17 As a
historical matter, legislative courts have been permissible for U.S. possessions
or territories, regardless of the subject matter of the dispute.18 Military courts,
which try and punish offenses by members of the armed forces while they are
in active service, have also been permissible.19 Additionally, military tribunals
for those engaged in war against the United States may sometimes be
allowed.20

17. Nelson, supra note 16, at 562–63 (distinguishing between public rights and private rights
and noting the level of Article III court involvement necessary for each). Some scholars have
suggested that this approach which seeks to determine the permissible jurisdiction of legislative
courts by the category of right at stake is not fully accepted by the Supreme Court and lacks
coherent boundaries. See, e.g., RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART & WECHSLER’S THE
FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 332–33 (6th ed. 2009); Daniel J. Meltzer,
Congress, Courts, and Constitutional Remedies, 86 GEO. L.J. 2537, 2571 (1998); Martin H.
Redish, Legislative Courts, Administrative Agencies, and the Northern Pipeline Decision, 1983
DUKE L.J. 197, 204–05 (1983); Richard B. Saphire & Michael E. Solimine, Shoring Up Article
III: Legislative Court Doctrine in the Post CFTC v. Schor Era, 68 B.U. L. REV. 85, 111–20
(1988). Professor Nelson demonstrates the underlying logic in historical terms and explains its
continuing vitality in the Court’s jurisprudence, however. See Nelson, supra note 16.
18. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 224–29. Nelson suggests that the reason for this is that
the territorial courts do not exercise the power of the “whole” United States, but only the power
of their territory. Nelson, supra note 16, at 575–76.
19. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 10, at 230–33.
20. Id. at 233–36; see Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763 (1950) (holding that a military
commission could try German nationals for war crimes in Germany without any Article III
oversight); Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (allowing a military tribunal to try German
saboteurs in the United States for violations of the law of war). Most recently, Congress created a
military commission to try those held outside of the United States for terrorism or aiding
terrorism. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, div. A, title X, §108, 119 Stat.
2739, 2740–44; Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600. The
Supreme Court has held most recently that military detainees must have access to Article III
courts to challenge their detention, or the military tribunal must provide most of the key due
process protections that are available in federal courts. See Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229,
2274 (2008) (holding that the procedures provided by the Detainee Treatment Act are not a
sufficient substitute for habeas corpus relief in an Article III court and that the Article III review
was insufficient).
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Aside from these special courts, traditionally, Congress could create
legislative courts to adjudicate what are considered to be public rights.21
Public rights are those created by the federal government or held by the federal
government in trust for the benefit of all of us.22 Expenditures of money from
the public treasury, or entitlements, are classic examples.23 Thus, public rights
disputes usually involve non-criminal disputes between the government and
private parties in which core private rights of life, liberty, and property are not
at stake.24
The logic behind this principle was that where Congress has the discretion
to create the substantive right, it has the ability to shape that right, and to allow
it to be abrogated by congressional action without direct judicial oversight.25
Similarly, where Congress has created a right, it has the discretion to allow (or
not allow) parties to sue the government over that right, and having allowed
that, may dictate what shape that litigation must take.26
Contrasted with these public rights disputes are private right disputes.
Private rights include core rights to life, liberty, and property, but more
broadly, those rights held by individuals, and not by the public at large.27 Your
average tort case is a private right dispute, involving two private parties,
concerning a right established by common law or state statute, and seeking
liability and damages for past acts.28 Disputes over private rights “lie at the

21. N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 69–70, 70 n.24 (1982)
(plurality opinion).
22. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 566.
23. Id. at 570.
24. Id. at 569–72; see N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 70 n.24 (plurality opinion).
25. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 570–72; see also, N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80–81 (plurality
opinion) (determining that Congress has the power, upon creating a substantive federal right to
prescribe the manner of adjudicating that right).
26. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 582–84; see also N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 80 (plurality
opinion) (“[Congress] possesses substantial discretion to prescribe the manner in which that right
may be adjudicated . . . .”). Even when a plaintiff had a core private right at stake—where a
person sued to redress an injury to liberty or property—the matter could be handled without
judicial involvement because the government itself had not actually injured the person, but was
simply indemnifying the government official who had. Nelson, supra note 16, at 584. This
rationale is in line with sovereign immunity jurisprudence more generally. See Bivens v. Six
Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 388 (1971) (implying a
private right of action to sue federal officials for injuries caused in violation of federal law or the
Constitution); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56, 167 (1908) (holding that a state official
could be sued for prospective injunctive relief for violations of the law because the state itself
could not violate the law); cf. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 187 (1961) (holding that
government officers could be sued for damages for injuring a person in violation of federal law or
the Constitution), overruled on other grounds by Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658
(1978).
27. Nelson, supra note 16, at 567.
28. See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 69–70 (plurality opinion).
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core of the historically recognized judicial power.”29 Thus, these disputes
require significant oversight by an Article III court.30 Still, even where private
rights are at stake, non-Article III actors can exercise significant adjudicatory
power.31
In addition to the type of interest at stake, the legitimacy of political branch
adjudication depends on the manner and extent to which the non-judicial actor
can bind individuals. This depends on two things: (1) whether the agency
action is forward or backward looking; and (2) whether the non-judicial actor’s
decision is self-executing.
Congress has significantly broader power to create obligations reaching
into the future and very little power to attach new consequences to past acts.32
It is primarily the judiciary that has the latter power. Thus, litigation about the
amount of social security benefits a person might be entitled to in the future
can take place entirely in a legislative court, but challenges to the
constitutionality of an action taken by the Social Security Administration
might need more oversight by an Article III court.
Whether the non-judicial actor’s decision is self-executing is really more
of a mechanism for ensuring a goodly amount of Article III court supervision.
If the prevailing party needs to take the agency’s decision to a federal court in
order to have the decision enforced, that court will be able to review the
grounds of the decision, the processes followed to reach it, and the evidence
before the decision maker. This process may allow more reaching review by
the federal judiciary than ordinary administrative or appellate review, in which
the courts are often required to be very deferential to fact-finding,

29. Id. at 70 (plurality opinion).
30. Id. at 77 (plurality opinion). The extent of that oversight has been the subject of much
scholarly debate. See, e.g., Fallon, supra note 13 (proposing that appellate review by Article III
courts be sufficient on something of a sliding scale depending upon the interests at stake); Nelson,
supra note 16, at 609–13 (summarizing the current state of the law classifying whether Article III
oversight is necessary and to what extent based on the type of right at issue); James E. Pfander,
Article I Tribunals, Article III Courts, and the Judicial Power of the United States, 118 HARV. L.
REV. 643, 689–97 (2004) (arguing that the Supreme Court must have some sort of oversight over
agency adjudication); Redish, supra note 17, at 208–09, 226–27 (arguing that matters listed in
Article III section 2 must get fairly searching review in an Article III court); Saphire & Solimine,
supra note 17, at 139–44 (arguing that ordinary administrative review with de novo review of the
law and something like substantial evidence review of the facts must be available in an Article III
court for any agency adjudication).
31. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 625 (discussing how Congress and the Executive do not
need to use “judicial” power to adjudicate many private interests).
32. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 562, 595–98; see also Ann Woolhandler, Public Rights,
Private Rights, and Statutory Retroactivity, 94 GEO. L.J. 1015, 1023–27 (2006) (discussing the
prohibition of retroactive legislation on private rights).
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interpretation of the law, and application of the law to the facts.33
Additionally, if Article III courts have supervisory authority over the nonjudicial actor, they will have even more control over the content of the
decision.
While these lines on the nature of the right at stake and the manner in
which relief is provided are helpful, the most recent Supreme Court decisions
on the issue have not focused on them as explicitly as it had previously. A bit
of history here might be helpful.
A.

The Supreme Court’s Article I Adjudication Decisions

The Court has several times considered cases in which non-Article III
actors have been given the power to adjudicate, or to participate in the
adjudication, of what have traditionally been considered private right claims—
claims of life, liberty, or “old” property, which include property rights long
recognized in tangible and intangible things, as opposed to “new” property,
which refers to governmental entitlements, services, and licenses.34 And while
these cases do allocate particular matters and types of decisions to Article I
decision makers or Article III decision makers by considering the factors laid
out above, a more detailed analysis of the cases reveals the nuances of those
factors and how they interact.
1.

Crowell v. Benson: Setting the Stage

In the first of these cases to go beyond the traditional categories, Crowell v.
Benson, the Court was asked to consider whether an administrative agency
could be given the power to decide workers’ compensation disputes for
workers injured in maritime accidents.35 Such workers were not covered by
state workers’ compensation laws because maritime accidents were covered by
maritime law, and thus, exclusively federal.36 The agency actor, the deputy

33. See, e.g., Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. Defenders of Wildlife, 127 S. Ct. 2518, 2529–
30 (2007) (applying the deferential “arbitrary and capricious” standard to an Environmental
Protection Agency action).
34. The label and analysis of this new kind of property comes from Charles A. Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). Both Professors Fallon and Nelson have recognized that
old and new property have been treated differently by the Court in this area, with adjudication of
rights related to new property receiving less Article III involvement. See Fallon, supra note 13, at
952, 966–67 (using the term “right” to talk about things generally considered old property and the
term “privilege” to talk about at least some new property and arguing, however, that the
distinction between rights and privileges has been eroded and many privileges should get greater
Article III court protection); Nelson, supra note 16, at 606; see also Stephen F. Williams, Liberty
and Property: The Problem of Government Benefits, 12 J. LEGAL STUD. 3, 11–13 (1983)
(discussing Reich’s approach).
35. 285 U.S. 22, 37 (1932).
36. See id. at 37–41.
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commissioner of the United States Employees’ Compensation Commission,
was empowered to hold hearings and decide whether compensation was owed
under the terms of the statute and if so, in what amount.37 The deputy
commissioner’s order was self-executing, in the sense that it was final; it could
be set aside on application to a federal district court within thirty days, but
payment would proceed as ordered unless the federal court stayed the payment
on the ground that the employer would suffer irreparable damage.38 The order
was not wholly self-executing, in the sense that the commissioner lacked the
power to compel action by an employer who refused to comply. If the
employer refused to comply, the beneficiary of an award had to apply for
enforcement to a federal district court, which would decide whether the order
“was made and served in accordance with law” and which would issue a
mandatory injunction if it was.39
The Court determined that this matter, “liability of one individual to
another under the law as defined” was a matter of private right.40 But that fact
alone did not mean that all matters related to the decision-making process be
handled by an Article III judge.
[I]n cases of that sort, there is no requirement that, in order to maintain the
essential attributes of the judicial power, all determinations of fact in
constitutional courts shall be made by judges. . . . In cases of equity and
admiralty, it is historic practice to call to the assistance of the courts, without
the consent of the parties, masters and commissioners or assessors, to pass
upon certain classes of questions, as, for example, to take and state an account
or to find the amount of damages. While the reports of masters and
commissioners in such cases are essentially of an advisory nature, it has not
been the practice to disturb their findings when they are properly based upon
evidence, in the absence of errors of law, and the parties have no right to
41
demand that the court shall redetermine the facts thus found.

Moreover, the scope of the agency’s jurisdiction was quite narrow, “confined
to the relation of master and servant, and the method of determining the
questions of fact, which arise in the routine of making compensation awards to
employees under the Act, is necessary to its effective enforcement. The Act
itself . . . establishes the measure of the employer’s liability . . . .”42 The
agency’s function was rather mechanical, and tightly linked to the
administration of the program.

37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.

Id. at 42–44.
Id. at 44–45.
Id. at 45.
Crowell, 285 U.S. at 51.
Id. at 51–52 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 54.
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Thus, for at least some kinds of cases, non-judicial decision makers can be
used by the Article III court to manage litigation and do a preliminary finding
of facts, which judges need review only to gauge whether they are “based on
evidence” and made in the absence of errors of law. In other words,
administrative adjudicators can decide what really happened in the underlying
dispute. But the effects of that decision go one step further. At least for factintensive questions, administrative adjudicators get to decide, or at least get the
first stab at, what the end result of the dispute should be upon application of
the law they are charged with enforcing to these facts.
The Court did place some limitations on the kinds of decisions that would
receive this much deference. Questions related to the validity of the statute
being enforced, its constitutionality, for example, or whether the statute applied
to the situation at issue, had to be determined by the Article III court de novo.43
The mechanism of review for these types of decisions, a suit in equity, ensured
that parties could plead and prove with evidence before the district court that
the statute was invalid or did not apply.44
The Court applied the reasoning in Crowell to validate the use of
magistrates, non-Article III judges, in dispositive matters in criminal cases,
which are also private rights matters because they involve rights to life and
liberty, in United States v. Raddatz.45 The mechanism of review of magistrate
decisions is even more direct: a magistrate issues a report and recommendation
on the matter to be decided, and the district court decides how much weight to
give, if any, to any part objected to by a party.46 The district court judge can
receive further evidence or send the matter back to the magistrate with
instructions.47 Moreover, the control of the case as a whole is more direct—the
case is filed with the district court, and the district court judge decides whether
to refer particular matters to a magistrate, or the parties can consent to having a
magistrate conduct the proceedings and enter final orders.48 Additionally, the
control of the magistrates themselves is within the judicial branch: Article III
judges appoint magistrates for fixed terms and set their salaries.49
2.

Northern Pipeline: Stumbling Towards a Test

The Court invalidated adjudication by non-Article III decision makers in
Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., which struck

43.
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45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

See id. at 60–63.
Id. at 46, 63–64.
447 U.S. 667, 682–83 (1980).
Id. at 673–74 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
Id. at 674 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)).
See 28 U.S.C. § 636 (2006).
Id. §§ 631, 634.
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down the Bankruptcy Act of 1978.50 That Act created a system of bankruptcy
judges to adjudicate all civil proceedings arising under the bankruptcy title or
“arising in or related to cases under title 11.”51 That broad grant meant that the
bankruptcy judge could hear a wide variety of claims:
suits to recover accounts, controversies involving exempt property, actions to
avoid transfers and payments as preferences or fraudulent conveyances, and
causes of action owned by the debtor at the time of the petition for bankruptcy.
The bankruptcy courts can hear claims based on state law as well as those
based on federal law.
The judges of the bankruptcy courts are vested with all of the “powers of a
court of equity, law, and admiralty,” except that they “may not enjoin another
court or punish a criminal contempt not committed in the presence of the judge
of the court or warranting a punishment of imprisonment.” In addition to this
broad grant of power, Congress has allowed bankruptcy judges the power to
hold jury trials, to issue declaratory judgments, to issue writs of habeas corpus
under certain circumstances, to issue all writs necessary in aid of the
bankruptcy court’s expanded jurisdiction, and to issue any order, process or
52
judgment that is necessary or appropriate . . . .

The decision yielded no majority opinion, but a majority of the judges held that
allowing non-Article III decision makers such broad jurisdiction over
inherently judicial matters, particularly state law matters, and such broad
powers to act without supervision, in the sense of prior approval or searching
review, by Article III courts violated Article III and the principle of separation
of powers.53 The plurality’s opinion focused on the traditional categories in
which legislative courts had been recognized, stated that those categories
should not be expanded, and would have found that this delegation was
unconstitutional because it did not fit any of the traditional categories.54 The
concurrence did not agree that the categorical approach urged by the plurality
was a wholly accurate summary of prior cases, but did agree that more Article
III oversight was necessary.55
3.

Thomas v. Union Carbide and Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor: Converging on an Approach

The two most recent cases the Supreme Court has decided were very
similar to each other and related to areas heavily regulated by federal law: the
licensing and labeling of pesticides and the regulation of the commodities

50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
Id. at 54 (emphasis omitted) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1471(b) (Supp. 1976)).
Id. at 54–55 (footnote omitted) (citations omitted).
Id. at 73–76, 83–87 (plurality opinion); id. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
Id. at 63–64, 70–76 (plurality opinion).
N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 91–92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
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markets.56 The statute at issue in Thomas v. Union Carbide Agricultural
Products allowed companies seeking to register a pesticide to piggyback on a
prior company’s research to demonstrate the health, safety, and environmental
effects of the product.57 The follow-on company had to pay compensation to
the initial company, and the statute created a system of binding arbitration,
with very limited review in the federal courts, to determine the appropriate
level of compensation.58 Several companies that had done initial research and
that felt the compensation awarded was too low challenged the system, arguing
that decisions about their rights to property had to be made with much more
involvement by Article III courts.59
The Supreme Court disagreed, however. The Court rejected the argument
that any dispute between private parties was automatically a “private rights”
dispute or that the right to compensation was a state common law right.60
While there may be some private right characteristics in the statutory right to
compensation—the initial company might be said to have some type of
property right in its research—the statutory right also had public right
characteristics—use of the data serves the public purpose of safeguarding
public health.61 Additionally, there had never actually been a recognized
property right in this type of information. While there is a property right in
research that falls under trade secrets doctrine, that right exists only while the
information is kept secret.62 Because the research had to be disclosed to the
agency for the pesticides to be sold to the public, the research was no longer
secret, and no common law or state statute recognized a property interest in
that information any more.63 Moreover, underlying this reasoning was broader
context—the system regulating the sale of these dangerous chemicals: there
was no freestanding unfettered property right to sell products potentially
dangerous to the public health and the environment. In other words, there was
an ex ante barrier to the sale in the first place.64

56. Commodity Futures Trading Comm’n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833, 835–36 (1986); Thomas
v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568, 571 (1985).
57. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 571.
58. Id. at 573–74. The federal courts could review the arbitrator’s findings and
determination only for fraud, misconduct, or misrepresentation. Id. They also could review any
constitutional challenges, however. Id. at 592.
59. Id. at 584–85.
60. Id. at 584–86.
61. Id. at 589.
62. Thomas, 473 U.S. at 584.
63. Id.
64. See Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1020 (1984) (analyzing the statutes at
issue and holding the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act not to constitute an
uncompensated taking that would violate the Fifth Amendment).
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Resolving the issue, the Court held that “Congress . . . may create a
seemingly ‘private’ right that is so closely integrated into a public regulatory
scheme as to be a matter appropriate for agency resolution with limited
involvement by the Article III judiciary.”65 The import of the Court’s ruling
might also be to suggest that if there would be no right but for Congress’
creation, the right/privilege distinction highlighted by Professors Fallon and
Nelson,66 then there is no right sufficiently private, or no matter inherently
judicial enough, to require extensive Article III involvement.
In the most recent case on the subject, Commodity Futures Trading
Commission v. Schor,67 the statute at issue also related to a field highly
regulated by Congress, with ex ante barriers to entry, but the issue that could
be decided by the non-Article III decision maker was not quite as narrow. The
Commodity Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) had jurisdiction to
adjudicate claims brought by customers against brokers for violations of the
Commodity Exchange Act or the CFTC’s regulations.68 There was also a
permissive counterclaim regulation: the CFTC could adjudicate counterclaims,
including state law counterclaims, arising out of the transactions or
occurrences set forth in the complaint.69 The jurisdiction over counterclaims
was not exclusive; the counterclaim did not have to be raised in this
proceeding, but could be raised in other fora.70 And the final agency decision
was subject to review in federal circuit court, but the review was ordinary
administrative review, not very searching.71
A customer brought an action within the CFTC against his broker, alleging
that a debit balance in his account was caused by the broker’s violations of the
Act.72 The broker brought a diversity action in federal district court seeking to
recover that debit balance, and the customer counterclaimed that the debit was
caused by the violations of the Act.73 The customer twice moved in the federal
court to stay or dismiss the action as duplicative of the CFTC proceedings, and
so the broker voluntarily dismissed the district court action and brought the
action to recover the balance as a counterclaim to the customer’s agency
action.74 When the customer lost, he challenged the agency’s decision, and the
Court of Appeals, sua sponte, raised the question of whether the CFTC’s

65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.

Thomas, 473 U.S. at 593–94.
Fallon, supra note 13, at 966–67; Nelson, supra note 16, at 566–67.
478 U.S. 833 (1986).
Id. at 836.
Id. at 837.
Id.
See id. at 838–39.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 837.
Id. at 837–38.
Id. at 838.
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jurisdiction over the counterclaim, which arose under state law, was
constitutional.75
Unlike in Thomas, the right at stake for the customer and for the broker
was a traditional common law right, and the Supreme Court recognized that the
“private rights” nature of the counterclaim was significant to the analysis.76
However, the Court held that the private rights nature of the claim was not
determinative.77 Article III is not solely concerned with protecting the private
rights of individuals78 in the Court’s view; rather Article III seeks to protect the
interests of the judicial branch itself, reserving the judicial branch’s appropriate
structural role as a check on the executive and legislative branches, and only to
a lesser extent does Article III protect individual rights, primarily through
those same checks.79
With this structural interest as the touchstone, the Court established a
combination balancing and threshold test to take account of those two interests.
The balancing part requires a court to look to the scope of the agency’s
jurisdiction.80 When agency adjudication is subject to ordinary review, it will
be constitutional as long as the subject-matter jurisdiction of the agency does
not encroach too far into the regular work of the judicial branch.81 And the
threshold test focused on the individual right to an independent judiciary.82 As
long as the parties consented to adjudication before the agency, then this right
would not be injured.83
Applying the new test to the case before it, the Court upheld the CFTC’s
decision.84 Because the CFTC’s jurisdiction over state law counterclaims was
very narrow—those claims had to arise in connection with commodities
brokerage accounts, an area of law that was highly regulated by Congress—the
power to adjudicate the claims did not encroach very far into the regular work
of the judicial branch.85 And because the parties consented to having the
agency adjudicate the claim, they had waived any individual interest they may
have had in having an Article III court adjudicate the claim.86

75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.

Id. at 838–39.
Id. at 853.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 853, 855–57.
For a discussion of the personal right to an independent judicial forum, see id. at 848–50.
Id. at 848, 850–52.
Id. at 851.
Id. at 851–52.
Schor, 478 U.S. at 848–49.
Id. at 849–50.
Id. at 857.
Id. at 852–53.
Id. at 849–50.
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Synthesizing the Whole Mess

Thus, there are a number of lines that need to be drawn to map out the
appropriate role for an administrative agency in any kind of enforcement
scheme, any one of which could be the starting point for analysis. First,
assuming no concurrent jurisdiction, which is likely relatively rare, what are
the mechanism and scope of Article III courts’ control over the agency
process? Non-judicial determinations that require some kind of positive action
in the federal court or direct appeal as of right with de novo review will tend to
provide the most oversight of the process for decision. At the same time, the
courts provide a mechanism for waiver of that review, essentially consent to
the non-Article III adjudication, by anyone not seeking enforcement or direct
appeal. Giving Article III judges supervisory control in a human resources
sense will provide for even more direct oversight and will allow for corrections
where infringement goes beyond the individual interests in Article III
adjudication and into the structural interests of the federal courts, in Schor’s
terms. Appointments by the executive branch and ordinary administrative
review, on the other hand, will provide for the least amount of oversight, and
will make sense when there is little structural interest at stake.
If there is little Article III oversight, only ordinary administrative review,
for example, the other question to be asked is, are the rights potentially at stake
public rights or private rights? Only in private rights cases need there be
Article III oversight, and even in private rights cases, non-judicial actors can
decide some matters with little oversight. The amount of oversight seems to
depend on the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction and the type of private
rights potentially at stake.87 In all of the cases, the scope of the non-judicial
actor’s subject-matter jurisdiction was relevant.88 The more narrow the
jurisdiction, the more likely review could be deferential and the less direct
need be the supervision of the non-judicial actor’s day-to-day work by the
Article III court. That is the structural interest the Court refers to in Schor.89
And, the type of private right at stake also matters here. Decisions about life,
liberty, and property recognized at common law need significant oversight,
either because they are core private rights or because as core private rights,
they are inherently judicial matters and taking them from the courts will work a
substantial institutional injury.
Another way to look at the public or private rights distinction is whether
the contemplated agency action is forward looking or backward looking. A
determination of liability, looking backward on past acts, is more likely to
impact a private right and requires significant Article III involvement. A cease

87. See Schor, 478 U.S. at 853–54.
88. See supra notes 53, 80–81 and accompanying text.
89. See supra note 79 and accompanying text.
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and desist order limiting permissible conduct in the future is essentially just
like Congress declaring a particular practice to be impermissible now and into
the future, and thus, requires much less Article III oversight.90 It also, in most
cases, won’t involve any sort of private right unless the cease and desist order
is so broad as to be confiscatory.
This flowchart illustrates how the analysis plays out.

With this analysis set out, we’ll turn now to an explanation of why agency
adjudication is a potentially attractive regulatory option in the employment
discrimination context, and then apply the analysis to that context to highlight
the constitutional difficulties agency adjudication might pose and the design
solutions that would avoid these problems.
II. THE CASE FOR A NEW AGENCY STRUCTURE
As I explained more fully in a prior article, two somewhat interrelated
reasons that the employment discrimination laws are not as effective as they
could be are what I have called the enforcement gap and the secrecy problem,
both of which are caused by an overreliance on adjudication without support
from other regulatory tools.91 This part will explain what those problems are
and how reliance on private adjudication causes them.
I will start with the enforcement gap, which simply refers to the fact that
our laws prohibiting discrimination are not being fully enforced. The existence

90. See Nelson, supra note 16, at 596–97.
91. Marcia L. McCormick, The Truth Is Out There: Revamping Federal Antidiscrimination
Enforcement for the Twenty-First Century, 30 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 193, 207–22 (2009).
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of this gap is demonstrated by the failure of Title VII and the other
employment discrimination statutes92 to substantially eliminate employment
discrimination.93 Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the main tool
designed to create equality at work, has been in effect for more than forty
years—more than two generations.94 And while Title VII and laws patterned
on it that protect additional groups have helped to make a difference for many,
the United States is not yet in a position to say that it has achieved equality. In
fact, scholars are becoming ever more vocal about the lack of racial and gender
equality in the workforce under almost any measure: employment rates, wages,
job integration, and labor force participation.95 And while some people have
argued that Title VII has eliminated most overt discrimination,96 others have
contradicted that, pointing, for example, to large class actions brought against
92. Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (2006),
prohibits employment discrimination on the basis of race, color, national origin, religion, and sex.
Id. § 2000e-2(a). Several other statutes also prohibit discrimination. One such statute prohibits
discrimination in contracts, including at-will employment, on the basis of race. 42 U.S.C. § 1981
(2006). The Equal Pay Act of 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-38, 77 Stat. 56 (codified as amended in
scattered sections of 29 U.S.C.), prohibits discrimination in compensation on the basis of sex.
The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, Pub. L. No. 90-202, 81 Stat. 602 (codified
as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 621–34 (2006)), prohibits discrimination on the basis of age.
Similarly Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, tit. I, 104
Stat. 327, 330–37 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12111–17 (2006)), prohibits employment
discrimination against qualified individuals with disabilities. Sections 501 and 504 of the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-112, tit. V, §§ 501, 504, 87 Stat. 355, 390–91, 394
(codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(a) (2006)), also prohibit discrimination, including
in employment, against those with disabilities, but only for recipients of federal funds. Likewise,
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, tit. VI, 78 Stat. 241, 252–53
(codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000d to 2000d-7 (2006)), prohibits discrimination, including in
employment, on the basis of race by recipients of federal funds, and Title IX of the Education
Amendments of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-318, tit. IX, § 901, 86 Stat. 335, 373–74 (codified as
amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1681 (2006)), prohibits discrimination, including in employment, on the
basis of gender by recipients of federal funds. Finally, the Family Medical Leave Act of 1993,
Pub. L. No. 103-3, 107 Stat. 6 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601, 2611–19 (2006)),
requires that family and medical leave be provided to employees regardless of gender.
93. McCormick, supra note 91, at 207.
94. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17.
95. See Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Structural Turn and the Limits of Antidiscrimination Law,
94 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 2 & nn.3 & 5–6 (2006); R. Richard Banks, Jennifer L. Eberhardt & Lee
Ross, Discrimination and Implicit Bias in a Racially Unequal Society, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1169,
1184 (2006); Guy-Uriel E. Charles, Toward a New Civil Rights Framework, 30 HARV. J.L. &
GENDER 353, 353–54 (2007); Rachel F. Moran, Whatever Happened to Racism?, 79 ST. JOHN’S
L. REV. 899, 900 (2005).
96. See, e.g., Bell & Howell Co. v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 136, 146 n.27 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (stating
that “in most instances Title VII has eliminated the more obvious and explicit forms of
discrimination”); John J. Donohue III & James J. Heckman, Re-Evaluating Federal Civil Rights
Policy, 79 GEO. L.J. 1713, 1713–14, 1729 (1991); Ronald Turner, Thirty Years of Title VII’s
Regulatory Regime: Rights, Theories, and Realities, 46 ALA. L. REV. 375, 480 (1995).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

58

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:39

big companies for expressly racist and sexist behavior.97 Michael Selmi, for
example, has gone so far as to label the form of discrimination alleged in these
current cases “seventies-style” discrimination.98 In two generations, we should
have gotten past the seventies. The system is not working as well as it should.
The system does not work as well as it should because the
antidiscrimination norm is unsettled, and the method of enforcing our ban on
employment discrimination is not suited to work social change. For the system
to work, we need greater public information and greater opportunities to work
towards consensus. To accomplish that goal, I have proposed that we create a
federal agency designed to make public employee and applicant allegations of
discrimination, investigations of charges of discrimination, and adjudication of
such claims. Additionally, because of the national public interest in removing
discrimination entirely from the workplace, a federal agency with greater
regulatory power must also have the power to impose sanctions on offending
employers.
Although there are federal agencies with some power to enforce our laws
that prohibit employment discrimination,99 the primary enforcement
mechanism is the ex ante mechanism of a private right of action for injunctive
relief or damages against an employer,100 and this is what has led to the
enforcement gap. Private litigation is a poor enforcement tool for a number of

97. See, e.g., Nancy Levit, Megacases, Diversity, and the Elusive Goal of Workplace
Reform, 49 B.C. L. REV. 367, 367–68 (2008) (noting the increase in employment discrimination
class-action suits and the resulting multimillion dollar settlements); Michael Selmi, Sex
Discrimination in the Nineties, Seventies Style: Case Studies in the Preservation of Male
Workplace Norms, 9 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 1, 3 (2005) (arguing that class-action
discrimination suits suggest that discrimination is still present in the labor market).
98. Selmi, supra note 97.
99. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (“EEOC”) has some power to enforce
our employment discrimination laws. The EEOC adjudicates claims against federal employers,
and for private sector charges; it can investigate, seek conciliation, or bring an action in federal
court. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, 2000e-6, 2000e-8, 2000e-16 (2006). Employers with more than
100 employees are required to submit demographic data to the EEOC, as well, and that could lead
to investigations or an action in federal court. Id. § 2000e-8(c); 29 C.F.R. § 1602.7 (2010). The
Department of Labor’s Office of Contract Compliance Programs can require employers not to
discriminate as a condition of accepting a contract with the federal government. See U.S.
COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, FUNDING FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS ENFORCEMENT: THE PRESIDENT’S
2006 REQUEST ch. 3 (Sept. 2005), available at http://www.usccr.gov/pubs/crfund06/crfund
06.pdf. As part of that power, it can enforce those contractual provisions by conducting
compliance evaluations and complaint investigations, obtaining conciliation agreements,
monitoring contractors’ progress through periodic compliance reports, recommending
enforcement actions to the Solicitor of Labor, and debarring a company’s federal contracts plus
obtaining backpay and other relief for employees. Id.
100. See McCormick, supra note 91, at 205–06, 208 (contrasting the number of charges
brought to the EEOC and the number of private actions brought in federal court with the number
of actions filed by the EEOC).
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reasons. Many employees do not know their rights or do not realize they have
been discriminated against.101 Many who know their rights do not pursue
them; they might still be working for the employer and may fear retaliation.102
They may also fear that they would be labeled a troublemaker by other
employers and become essentially unemployable.103 Furthermore, even where
employees pursue their rights, they are rarely successful in federal court.104
And even when employees are successful, the remedies imposed rarely create
the kinds of structural changes that will help prevent discrimination by the
employer or other employers in the future.105
Reliance on private litigation also leads to suppression of information
about allegations of discrimination. I have labeled this the secrecy problem.106
The secrecy problem is caused in large part by channeling disputes into tracks
alternative to the public trial. Alternative dispute resolution is not a public

101. Cheryl R. Kaiser & Brenda Major, A Social Psychological Perspective on Perceiving
and Reporting Discrimination, 31 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 801, 804–06 (2006) (reporting that
many people do not accurately perceive when they have been discriminated against).
102. Sally Riggs Fuller, Lauren B. Edelman & Sharon F. Matusik, Legal Readings: Employee
Interpretation and Mobilization of Law, 25 ACAD. MGMT. REV. 200, 208 (2000) (summarizing
literature).
103. Nantiya Ruan, Bringing Sense to Incentives: An Examination of Incentive Payments to
Named Plaintiffs in Employment Discrimination Class Actions, 10 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J.
395, 396–97, 410–11 (2006); see also KRISTIN BUMILLER, THE CIVIL RIGHTS SOCIETY: THE
SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF VICTIMS 26–29 (1988) (reporting on a 1980 study by the Civil
Litigation Research Project).
104. For example, few cases go to trial. E.g., Theresa M. Beiner, The Misuse of Summary
Judgment in Hostile Environment Cases, 34 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 71, 120 (1999) (suggesting
that only ten percent of employment discrimination cases go to trial); Kevin M. Clermont &
Stewart J. Schwab, How Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in Federal Court, 1 J.
EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 440–41, 444 (2004) (suggesting that seventy percent of
employment discrimination cases settle and plaintiffs win just over four percent of pretrial
adjudications). When they do go to trial, few cases are resolved in favor of employees. Kevin M.
Clermont et al., How Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare in the Federal Courts of
Appeals, 7 EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 547, 556–58, 566 (2003) [hereinafter Clermont et al., How
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare] (finding that cases decided in favor of plaintiffs are
six times more likely to be reversed than those found in favor of defendants); Michael Selmi,
Proving Intentional Discrimination: The Reality of Supreme Court Rhetoric, 86 GEO. L.J. 279,
283–84, 309 (1997) [hereinafter Selmi, Proving Discrimination] (arguing that meritorious cases
are lost or reversed on appeal); Michael Selmi, Why Are Employment Discrimination Cases So
Hard to Win?, 61 LA. L. REV. 555, 558, 560 (2001) [hereinafter Selmi, Hard to Win] (asserting
that employers prevail in ninety-eight percent of federal court employment discrimination cases
resolved at the pretrial stage).
105. Levit, supra note 97, at 371, 379–80, 385; Michael Selmi, The Price of Discrimination:
The Nature of Class Action Employment Litigation and Its Effects, 81 TEX. L. REV. 1249 (2003)
(documenting how class actions fail to affect shareholder price or real management change in
most cases).
106. McCormick, supra note 91, at 209–11, 214–22.
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process, and resolutions are often kept confidential or at least not made
public.107 The secrecy problem is related to the reliance on litigation to
enforce the employment discrimination laws. Because of the expense of
traditional litigation, many employers look to alternative methods to resolve
disputes.108 One of these methods has been mandatory, binding arbitration, in
which the parties agree before any dispute has arisen to waive any right to go
to court and instead to use an arbitral forum. In the mid-nineties, the Supreme
Court endorsed pre-dispute arbitration agreements to resolve discrimination
claims,109 and many employers have required employees to agree as a
condition of employment to arbitrate any future disputes.110 Mandatory pre-

107. See Edward Brunet, Questioning the Quality of Alternative Dispute Resolution, 62 TUL.
L. REV. 1, 17 (1987); Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing the Facts, 14 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575, 601, 608–09 (1986).
108. See Harry T. Edwards, Alternative Dispute Resolution: Panacea or Anathema?, 99
HARV. L. REV. 668, 668–69 (1986).
109. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 23 (1991). The Court recently
confirmed that individual employees not only could be required to arbitrate their statutory
disputes as a condition of employment, but also that a union could waive individual employees’
rights to bring a statutory claim in court and agree to arbitration instead. 14 Penn Plaza LLC v.
Pyett, 129 S. Ct. 1456, 1469–70, 1474 (2009).
110. Several studies have been conducted to try to gauge how many businesses have adopted
mandatory arbitration. Those surveys reflected that by the late 1990s and early 2000s,
approximately fifteen percent of companies had adopted mandatory arbitration. Alexander J.S.
Colvin, From Supreme Court to Shopfloor: Mandatory Arbitration and the Reconfiguration of
Workplace Dispute Resolution, 13 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 581, 588 (2004) [hereinafter
Colvin, Mandatory Arbitration] (reporting on several surveys); see also KATHERINE V. W.
STONE, FROM WIDGETS TO DIGITS: EMPLOYMENT REGULATION FOR THE CHANGING
WORKPLACE 189 (2004) (noting that as of 2004, the number of employees covered by mandatory
arbitration agreements equaled the number covered by collective bargaining agreements). A mid1990s United States General Accounting Office survey suggested almost all firms with 100 or
more employees used some method of Alternative Dispute Resolution (“ADR”). U.S. GOV’T
ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/HEHS 95-150, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION: MOST
PRIVATE-SECTOR EMPLOYERS USE ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 7 (1995), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=gao&docid=f:he95150.pdf (reporting
that while only about ten percent of these employers used arbitration, almost ninety percent used
some form of ADR). About sixty-four percent of the workforce is employed by employers this
size or larger. See Statistics of U.S. Businesses, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU (2008), http://www2.cen
sus.gov/econ/susb/data/2008/us_state_ totals_2008.xls. And the larger the company, the more
likely it is to have used arbitration. See Michael H. LeRoy, Getting Nothing for Something: When
Women Prevail in Employment Arbitration Awards, 16 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 573, 578 n.22
(2005) (citing Alternative Dispute Resolution: Most Large Employers Prefer ADR as Alternative
to Litigation, Survey Says, [1997] DAILY LAB. REP. (BNA) No. 93, at A4 (May 14, 1997)). The
use of arbitration has increased since the late 1990s. Theodore Eisenberg & Elizabeth Hill,
Arbitration and Litigation of Employment Claims: An Empirical Comparison, 58 DISP. RESOL. J.,
Nov. 2003–Jan. 2004, at 44, 44. In his most recent article, Alexander Colvin suggests that nearly
one quarter of the workforce is covered by pre-dispute arbitration agreements. Alexander J.S.
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dispute arbitration for these statutory rights has been attacked, primarily on
fairness grounds: that employees really have no choice but to agree, that
employers can write the agreements to benefit themselves, and that arbitrators
may be more likely to rule in favor of repeat player employers.111 Such
agreements have been defended with arguments that arbitration is simply a
change in forum, not in the substantive law to be applied, that the process is
quicker and less expensive for employees as well, and that employees are more
likely to win in arbitration than in court.112 The debate will keep empiricists
busy for years.
It is not necessary to resolve this debate, though, to call for the solution
this Article calls for. In other words, potential unfairness to individual litigants
is not the only problem, and it is not the problem that this Article is primarily
concerned with. The much bigger problem is that arbitration, or any other
alternative form of dispute resolution the way it is currently structured, for that
matter, creates a complete lack of public accountability. The law need not be
followed in resolving the dispute, and the resolution is usually kept secret, or at

Colvin, Empirical Research on Employment Arbitration: Clarity Amidst the Sound and Fury?, 11
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 405, 411 (2007) [hereinafter Colvin, Empirical Research].
111. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims: Rights “Waived” and Lost in
the Arbitration Forum, 13 HOFSTRA LAB. L.J. 381, 403, 426 (1996); Alfred W. Blumrosen,
Exploring Voluntary Arbitration of Individual Employment Disputes, 16 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM
249, 254–55 (1983); Julius G. Getman, Labor Arbitration and Dispute Resolution, 88 YALE L.J.
916, 936 (1979); Robert A. Gorman, The Gilmer Decision and the Private Arbitration of PublicLaw Disputes, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 635, 656 (1995); Lewis Maltby, Paradise Lost–How the
Gilmer Court Lost the Opportunity for Alternative Dispute Resolution to Improve Civil Rights, 12
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 1, 4–5 (1994); Jean R. Sternlight, Panacea or Corporate Tool?:
Debunking the Supreme Court’s Preference for Binding Arbitration, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 637, 682–
83, 685–86 (1996) (discussing the unfairness of arbitration agreements to consumer plaintiffs).
112. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26; Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 110, at 414–19; Jean
R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1631, 1632–34
(2005) (describing both the level of criticism of mandatory arbitration agreements and their
expansive use). Some empirical research supports the assertion that arbitration is a boon for
employers at the expense of employees, Colvin, Empirical Research, supra note 110, at 414-19,
423-24, while other empirical research suggests that employees win slightly more often in
arbitration than they do in litigation, but are awarded less in damages, Lisa B. Bingham,
Employment Dispute Resolution: The Case for Mediation, 22 CONFLICT RESOL. Q. 145, 160
(2004); Lisa B. Bingham, Is There a Bias in Arbitration of Nonunion Employment Disputes? An
Analysis of Actual Cases and Outcomes, 6 INT’L J. CONFLICT MGMT. 369 (1995); Theodore
Eisenberg & Elizabeth T. Hill, Employment Arbitration and Litigation: An Empirical
Comparison, in ADR & THE LAW: DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW: 2003, at 8 (20th ed. 2006);
Michael H. LeRoy, supra note 110, at 576–77, 589 (asserting that employees tend to win in
arbitration but the value of the award is much less than what the courts offer); Lewis L. Maltby,
Employment Arbitration and Workplace Justice, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 105, 114–115 (2003); Lewis
L. Maltby, The Myth of Second-Class Justice: Resolving Employment Disputes in Arbitration, in
HOW ADR WORKS 915, 921–22 (Norman Brand ed., 2002).
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least not made public.113 If the public cannot find out that there has been a
dispute involving discrimination, what was alleged to have occurred, and what
the resolution was, the public can neither ensure that the employment
discrimination norm is being enforced, nor can it tell the nature of the norms
that are developing—in fact, norms don’t develop.
Neither the enforcement gap nor the secrecy problem would be especially
problematic if the disputes we were talking about were really simply disputes
between two private parties. If the injured sleep on their rights, they usually
hurt only themselves. And if the injured are satisfied with a relatively quick,
easy, and less expensive system of dispute resolution that needs little in the
way of public resources, everyone is better off.
Employment discrimination is not solely a private dispute, however. The
harm of employment discrimination reaches beyond the individual employee to
the group that employee is a member of and to the public at large.
Discrimination in the aggregate can create a permanent underclass, or keep one
segment of the population dependent on another.114 Moreover, as the recent
housing market crash, massive layoffs, government stimulus plans, move for
health care reform, and impending retirement savings crisis have demonstrated,
our economy and social welfare system literally depend on effective
functioning of the system of employment. Work is the vehicle through which
we distribute money and social goods. Thus, because acts of discrimination
harm the public and the public has so much at stake in labor relations in the
aggregate, the public has an interest to be vindicated in the enforcement

113. See Brunet, supra note 107, at 17; cf. Laura Macklin, Promoting Settlement, Foregoing
the Facts, 14 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 575, 583–601 (1986) (discussing the functions of
judicial fact-finding, including the requirement of adequate factual proof for judicial action);
Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Toward Another View of Legal Negotiation: The Structure of Problem
Solving, 31 UCLA L. REV. 754, 789–93 (1984) (arguing that negotiation frees the parties to reach
more creative solutions). But see Samuel Estreicher, Arbitration of Employment Disputes Without
Unions, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 753, 776–78, 786–89, 795–96 (1990) (mentioning some of the
constitutional problems with using arbitrators to adjudicate disputes involving statutes with
important public policy goals and concluding that the normal rules of arbitration need not apply
to such claims to bolster the constitutionality of this form of dispute resolution); Samuel
Estreicher & Zev J. Eigen, The Forum for Adjudication of Employment Disputes, in Research
Handbook on the Economics of Labor and Employment Law (manuscript at 12–14) (Michael L.
Wachter & Cynthia L. Estlund eds. forthcoming), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/pa
pers.cfm?abstract_id=1656618 (arguing that the shortcomings of arbitration can be compensated
for legislatively, making arbitration a better choice for adjudicating employment discrimination
claims).
114. See David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do We Stand on Equal Employment
Opportunity Law Enforcement, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1130–31 (1989) (outlining the economic
arguments advanced in favor of Title VII but noting that those who advanced that argument
concluded by saying that despite the economic justification, prohibiting discrimination in
employment was “the right thing to do” and an inalienable right).
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scheme. In that sense, the regulation of the employment relationship is much
more like regulation of the securities markets,115 the environment, workplace
safety, or food and drug safety than it is regulation of individual contractual
relationships, or discrete individual harms.
The employment relationship is not regulated like the environment, the
securities market, workplace safety, or food and drug safety, however. Those
systems of regulation include some ex ante barriers to entry: extensive
reporting requirements, the power to spread the information collected, the
power to inspect, and some coercive power, including the ability to fine
regulated parties.116 Instead, our enforcement system for employment
discrimination law relies primarily on allowing individual employees a private
right of action to sue employers for discrimination in courts.117 There is very
little federal oversight except incidentally through the courts when the parties
choose to air the issues there—the courts themselves may not vindicate the
public interest, although they do make public important information about the
dispute.
We might expect the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(“EEOC”), the agency created to enforce Title VII and given responsibility for
subsequent antidiscrimination laws as well, to serve that role, but it does not.
For private sector employment discrimination claims, the EEOC has the power
to investigate, but it depends primarily on private individuals bringing charges
to it, rather than on initiating its own investigations.118 Additionally, the
agency’s investigation is rather thin.119 Although an employer must respond to
a charge of discrimination and the EEOC can subpoena records, the agency
does not inspect workplaces, monitor employer behavior, or impose sanctions
on uncooperative or discriminating employers.120 Even more importantly, the

115. Linda Hamilton Krieger has made this comparison as well. Linda Hamilton Krieger, The
Watched Variable Improves: On Eliminating Sex Discrimination in the Workplace, in SEX
DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORKPLACE: MULTIDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 295, 317–20 (Faye J.
Crosby et al. eds., 2007).
116. I do not mean to suggest that enforcement in these areas is perfect. See supra note 1.
117. See supra notes 99–100 and accompanying text.
118. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (2006).
119. The EEOC has, by statute, 180 days to investigate a charge before it must give a
complainant a right to sue letter. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1). However, a series of cases involving
early-issued right to sue letters, where the EEOC has certified that it will be unable to complete
its administrative processing within 180 days suggests that the EEOC does not investigate some
claims at all. See Patroski v. Ridge, No. 2:10-cv-967, 2010 WL 5069941, at *8–9 (W. D. Pa.
Dec. 7, 2010) (holding the EEOC may issue early right to sue letters, but dismissing complaint
without prejudice for failure to exhaust remedies where the EEOC issued a right to sue letter six
days after a charge was filed).
120. See 29 C.F.R. § 1601.15–.17 (2010) (outlining EEOC procedures for investigation of a
discrimination suit). See generally EEOC v. Konica Minolta Business Solutions U.S.A., Inc., 639
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EEOC cannot make public information contained in the charges it receives, nor
can it reveal much information it gathers from employers who have to file
compliance reports with it.121
The EEOC also has little impact on determining when an employee has a
valid discrimination claim. It acts as something of a gatekeeper to the courts,
but it is a very weak one. An employee has to file a charge with the EEOC
before the employee can bring a claim in court under Title VII, but the EEOC’s
analysis of the claim has no bearing on the employee’s ability to pursue the
matter in court.122 After receiving a charge, the EEOC investigates the claim
and attempts to conciliate.123 The EEOC also currently has a policy of
encouraging mediation.124 If those processes fail, the EEOC decides whether
the facts suggest that the employer discriminated.125 If the EEOC believes the
employer has discriminated, the EEOC will make a finding to that effect and
issue a letter to the employee giving the employee a right to sue the employer
in court.126 While everyone must start with the EEOC, the gate does not close
once that step has been satisfied. The EEOC will issue right to sue letters to
employees where it has not yet completed its investigation and even where it
has found that the facts do not suggest that the employer discriminated.127
Only the passage of time will cut off an employee’s ability to get permission to
sue an employer.128 An EEOC finding thus has no bearing on the ability of an
employee to bring a claim in court. Moreover, the action that a person brings
is not an action to review the EEOC’s judgment about whether the employer
discriminated, and so no deference is owed the EEOC’s finding of cause or no
F.3d 366, 368, 369 (7th Cir. 2011) (discussing the standard used to judge the reasonableness of
EEOC subpoena power).
121. The EEOC is forbidden from releasing this data by law: 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(b),
2000e-8(e). The Office of Contract Compliance Programs, the agency that enforces federal laws
incorporated into federal contracts against those contractors, similarly keeps some of this
information secret, 41 C.F.R. §§ 60-1.20(g), 60-40.3 (2011), but it can release information from
employer compliance reports, id. § 60-40.4 (interpreting Title VII’s bar on disclosure to apply
only to EEOC employees).
122. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f).
123. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b).
124. NAT’L ACAD. OF PUB. ADMIN., EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION:
ORGANIZING FOR THE FUTURE 15 (2003).
125. See The Charge Handling Process, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/employees/process.cfm
(last visited Oct. 10, 2011) (stating that the EEOC will close a charge if they decided they
“probably will not be able to find discrimination”).
126. The EEOC can instead decide to bring an action, in which an employee can intervene,
but the EEOC does so in only a tiny fraction of the charges filed with it. McCormick, supra note
91, at 219 (giving figures for the number of cases brought out of the number of charges filed by
the EEOC).
127. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1).
128. See id. § 2000e-5(e)(1) (requiring a charge to be filed within 180 days after the alleged
unlawful employer activity).
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cause even if it has made one in the charge.129 Thus, the EEOC is a gatekeeper
only in the loosest sense of the word.
The EEOC is a weak agency in other respects, as well. It has the power to
issue regulations, but not substantive interpretive regulations, having the force
of law.130 Following the EEOC’s regulations gives employers an affirmative
defense to an action under Title VII,131 but that is the extent of the EEOC’s
potential to influence employer behavior to prevent discrimination. Employers
are not bound to follow the regulations, and the courts rarely defer to those
regulations.132 And to make matters worse, on the prosecutorial side, the
EEOC has never been funded enough to bring claims in all or even a
substantial minority of meritorious cases.133 Additionally, it doesn’t appear
that the EEOC is any more an expert at assessing discrimination than the courts
themselves. A recent study shows that the EEOC system to rate complaints
according to the likelihood that cause exists to believe the employer
discriminated did not predict case outcomes in federal court.134 This fact might
show that the EEOC lacks the expertise to analyze discrimination claims, that
the federal courts lack that expertise, or that the norm defining discrimination
is unsettled. Regardless of the explanation, it demonstrates that the EEOC has
not been effective at enforcing that norm.
To remedy the enforcement gap and the secrecy problem, the public needs
better access to information, more control over development of the
antidiscrimination norm, and a more effective incentive system to promote
compliance by employers. One way to accomplish these goals is to
consolidate the process of adjudication in a body with expertise in
discrimination law and expertise in the social sciences, particularly in human
and organizational behavior and in economics.
This model is attractive for several reasons. First, the law on employment
discrimination is a relatively specialized field, between the complicated proof
129. Cf. Melissa Hart, Skepticism and Expertise: The Supreme Court and the EEOC, 74
FORDHAM L. REV. 1937 (2006) (describing the lack of deference the Supreme Court has given to
the EEOC’s interpretation of Title VII).
130. The EEOC can issue substantive regulations under the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act, 29 U.S.C. § 628 (2006) and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §
12116 (2006).
131. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-12(b).
132. See Hart, supra note 129, at 1939, 1941–49.
133. See 4 U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, TEN-YEAR CHECKUP: HAVE FEDERAL AGENCIES
RESPONDED TO CIVIL RIGHTS RECOMMENDATIONS? 40, 42 (2004), available at http://www.us
ccr.gov/pubs/10yr04/10yr04.pdf.
134. Uncertain Justice: Litigating Claims of Employment Discrimination in the
Contemporary U.S., RESEARCHING L., Spring 2008, at 4. Using a large random sampling of
employment discrimination cases filed between 1988 and 2003, the authors studied the resolution
of those cases, accounting for the stage of litigation at which they were resolved in addition to the
substantive outcome. Id. at 2.
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structures and the complex theoretical foundation, so that adjudications by
experts will be more cost effective and lead to more consistent application of
the law. Second, enough individuals injured by discrimination have difficulty
getting relief through the system that expanding the availability of
adjudications will create greater access to justice. Third, the consistent
application of the law and the better dissemination of information will better
signal to employers what practices constitute discrimination, which will allow
them to better avoid it.
What I propose is for Congress to create a new federal agency to, among
other things, adjudicate private sector discrimination claims.135 Employees
would have to file charges with the agency, just as they do now, and this
agency would investigate those charges. The agency would also be able to
institute its own investigations. So far, this is similar to the EEOC functions,
but unlike the EEOC, the new agency would make public the allegations in the
charges and the employer’s response to those charges.136 Additionally, it
would hold hearings, make findings of fact, and conclude whether the law had
been violated. If the law had been violated, the agency would clarify what the
employer could do to comply with Title VII and what remedy the individual
should be awarded. The agency’s decision would be subject to ordinary
administrative review by a federal court, which would have to uphold factual
findings if based on substantial evidence and would have to accord most legal
conclusions and recommendations substantial deference.137 The new agency
would also be empowered to issue regulations with the force of law, codifying
its interpretation of what the antidiscrimination laws mean and how they
should be enforced.
Having a federal agency adjudicate discrimination claims has a number of
advantages over the current system. Agencies are created to harness the
expertise of adjudicators—both legal experts and non-law experts in the
135. The adjudicative body of the agency would be appointed by the President with the
advice and consent of the Senate, and members should be balanced by political party. Members
should also be balanced by background experience, coming from both the employee and
employer side. Finally, members should have some expertise in workplace law, organizational
psychology, business management, or some other relevant field.
136. This would be the default, but there would also have to be a process by which some
types of information and some proceedings could be kept sealed where privacy interests outweigh
the public’s need to know. Sexual harassment cases, for example, are likely to involve highly
private information and possibly humiliating details. A harassed employee would have a strong
interest in not having his or her identity or those details made public. On the employer side, there
may be instances in which proprietary information would be revealed. The employer would have
a strong interest in keeping that information confidential.
137. Based on the expertise of the agency adjudicators, the courts might be encouraged to
accord the legal recommendations significant deference, similar to that often accorded the
National Labor Relations Board. See, e.g., NLRB v. Curtin Matheson Scientific, Inc., 494 U.S.
775, 786 (1990).
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field—and having experts to decide discrimination cases could bring greater
coherence to this area of law. Administrative adjudications also conserve
scarce judicial resources by allowing non-Article III judges to manage the factfinding process in what can be very fact-intensive inquiries. And using nonArticle III judges can be cost effective, since the adjudicating labor market is
more flexible, and likely less costly. Because of this cost savings, more parties
can have access to the adjudicatory process, creating greater access to that
process for those who cannot afford or find legal assistance. Moreover, to the
extent that the federal courts might be using summary judgment and motions to
dismiss to rid their dockets of meritorious cases because they dislike this area
of law,138 having an agency handle this part of the adjudication may remove
such incentives.139
Creating a new agency to adjudicate discrimination claims also has
significant enforcement advantages. By making the information received by
the agency public, this scheme would solve much of the problem with the
secrecy gap. The public would know more about the allegations of
discrimination and what is happening at work, which would lead to a better
picture of whether we are meeting the goal of eliminating workplace
discrimination.140 Additionally, the public would have a better idea of the
content of the norm against employment discrimination. Even if the parties
agreed to keep the issues confidential, they would not be able to control the
agency.
Secrecy might still be achievable by employers; the parties could settle and
make the matter confidential by acting before the employee went to the
agency. That type of secrecy seems less problematic than the type we
currently have. If this scheme simply moves the point of optimal settlement to
a point earlier in the process, employers will work harder to not allow
employment discrimination to occur or to remedy it as soon as it is brought to
their attention, before the employee goes to the new agency, creating a greater
incentive for employers to internalize the antidiscrimination norm, avoiding

138. See Kevin M. Clermont & Stewart J. Schwab, Employment Discrimination Plaintiffs in
Federal Court: From Bad to Worse?, 3 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 103, 128 n.68 (2009); Joseph A.
Seiner, The Trouble with Twombly: A Proposed Pleading Standard for Employment
Discrimination Cases, 2009 ILL. L. REV. 1011, 1014–15 (2009); Selmi, Hard to Win, supra note
104, at 558; Suja A. Thomas, The New Summary Judgment Motion: The Motion to Dismiss Under
Iqbal and Twombly, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 15, 17–18, 32 (2010); cf. Selmi, Proving
Discrimination, supra note 104, at 283–84, 309 (noting the difficulty of proving discrimination
and that the Court views the world as “largely unaffected by discrimination”).
139. The fact that verdicts in favor of plaintiffs in employment discrimination cases are more
than six times as likely to be reversed than verdicts in favor of defendants, Clermont et al., How
Employment-Discrimination Plaintiffs Fare supra note 104, at 556–58, 566, makes me a little
hesitant to even be this optimistic.
140. See Krieger, supra note 115, at 318–19.

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

68

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:39

more injuries in the first place and accomplishing the main goal of
antidiscrimination law.
By giving the agency a much more direct role in enforcing Title VII, the
proposal also goes a long way towards closing the enforcement gap. There
will still be people who don’t know their rights, but that number is likely to
shrink the more information is made public about other cases. There will also
still be people who are deterred from pursuing their rights, but that too should
diminish, to some extent, the more settled the norm against discrimination
becomes. And with an expert cadre of adjudicators, the norm against
employment discrimination is likely to form in a more coherent manner,
creating greater predictability for employers and employees alike.
Despite these advantages, there are disadvantages and hurdles to having an
agency adjudicate discrimination claims. For example, if the EEOC has been
chronically underfunded,141 there seems little possibility that this new agency
would be funded adequately to fulfill its mandate. Similarly, if, as some
report, employers are well served by the current system in the sense that they
face little liability for discrimination because of the trend in federal courts,142
they will not support the creation of a new agency with independent
enforcement powers. Additionally, agencies, being less independent from
influence by market actors than Article III judges and less politically
accountable than elected officials, may simply carry out the agenda of a small
minority of actors rather than dispense the justice needed.
Aside from these pragmatic concerns are legal concerns as well, the
biggest of which in my view is the focus of this Article: Article III’s
limitations on the judicial power of the United States and life tenure and salary
protection for judges.
III. APPLYING THE ARTICLE III ANALYSIS TO AGENCY ADJUDICATION OF
EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
So given the analysis the Court has used, the necessary question to ask at
this point is whether an agency could adjudicate claims in the area to be
regulated. To illustrate this analysis, I will go back to the example of
employment discrimination. To analyze whether claims of employment
discrimination could be constitutionally adjudicated by the agency I have
proposed, we must determine whether discrimination is a private rights issue,
involving inherently judicial matters.143 If it is not, then the agency could
adjudicate claims with significant autonomy and little oversight by the Article

141. See Fiscal Year 2012 Congressional Budget Justification, EEOC, 1–2 (Feb. 2011),
http://www.eeoc.gov/eeoc/plan/upload/2012budget.pdf.
142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text.
143. See supra Part I.A.3.
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III courts. If discrimination involves private rights, however, significant
Article III oversight would be necessary.
The answer to this question of how much Article III oversight is required is
complicated. It requires us to analyze the nature of the right at stake as one
important data point, which is not an easy task. I will start by analyzing the
nature of the employer’s interest, differentiating among different types of
employers, and then turn to an analysis of the employee’s interest in each
context.
Government employers would have no private rights in the sense usually
discussed, and so analyzing their interests would seem relatively
straightforward. This is particularly true for the federal government, suits
against which would fit into the traditional public rights model. Thus, having
an agency adjudicate claims of discrimination by the federal government
would pose no Article III problems from the federal government’s perspective.
This is likely why the EEOC currently adjudicates these claims.144
States would likely also not be considered to have private rights in any
traditional sense, but states have an interest that is analogous in their immunity
from suit brought by individuals in federal courts, a right embodied in the
Eleventh Amendment.145 The Supreme Court has held that states cannot be
made amenable to suit for damages brought by a private party before a federal
agency without their consent.146 And so regardless of whether a state’s interest
as an employer would be characterized as a private right, unconsenting states
cannot be required to submit to the agency adjudication, at least for money
damages. Moreover, this right of the states does not depend on the amount of
Article III oversight because unconsenting states cannot be brought to federal
court, either.147 So, these claims might not be appropriate for inclusion in a
new agency. States can be sued against their will, however, by the federal
government, so any action brought by the agency itself, or the Department of
Justice if that was the prosecutorial arm for enforcement of these kinds of
cases, could be heard by the agency. Moreover, state officials can be sued
against their will for prospective injunctive relief.148 And so an agency might

144. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(b) (2006).
145. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
146. Fed. Mar. Comm’n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002).
147. U.S. CONST. amend. XI; see, e.g., Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S.
89, 100 (1984). Another potential solution to bring states under the authority of the proposed
agency would be to link consent to the acceptance of federal funds. Perhaps those federal
programs already administered by the states could include a provision requiring that employment
discrimination claims be subject to the agency, or perhaps the statute that creates the agency
could also provide funding for state antidiscrimination efforts, but include federal agency
jurisdiction over disputes against states as a condition of that funding.
148. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155–56 (1908).
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be able to exercise jurisdiction over all actions against officials for prospective
relief without much Article III oversight.
Private employers, whether private individuals or corporate entities, do
have rights to property and liberty, and so we must examine the nature of those
rights to determine how much Article III oversight would be required. Title
VII, when it was enacted, was revolutionary in many ways. It was a conscious
attempt by Congress to change society through legislation.149 When Congress
prohibited the practice of discrimination by employers, it encroached on what
had traditionally been nearly sacrosanct: managerial prerogative. In an
employment relationship, the law has traditionally protected private employers,
often on the rationale that they have property and liberty rights in the use of

149. Joseph P. Witherspoon, Civil Rights Policy in the Federal System: Proposals for a Better
Use of Administrative Process, 74 Yale L.J. 1171, 1171 (1965); see also ALFRED W.
BLUMROSEN, MODERN LAW: THE LAW TRANSMISSION SYSTEM AND EQUAL EMPLOYMENT
OPPORTUNITY 4 (1993) (arguing that “[t]he effort to ameliorate longstanding patterns of race and
sex subordination [through Title VII] is perhaps the most ambitious social reform effort ever
undertaken in America” (emphasis added)); David L. Rose, Twenty-Five Years Later: Where Do
We Stand on Equal Employment Opportunity Enforcement?, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1121, 1129
(1989) (citing H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 16 (1964)) (describing the legislative history of Title VII,
which made clear the desire for social change). The House Report that Rose cited noted
specifically that “[t]oday, more than 100 years after their formal emancipation, Negroes . . . are
by virtue of one or another type of discrimination not accorded the rights, privileges, and
opportunities which are . . . the birthright of all citizens.” H.R. REP. NO. 88-914, at 18.
For a discussion of this evolution in the context of race, see MICHAEL J. KLARMAN,
FROM JIM CROW TO CIVIL RIGHTS: THE SUPREME COURT AND THE STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL
EQUALITY 426, 432, 435–36, 441 (2004) (arguing that the passage of the Civil Rights Act of
1964 and the Voting Rights Act of 1965 were a reaction by the public to end the violent
oppression of Blacks); Robert D. Loevy, Introduction: The Background and Setting of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, in THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1964: THE PASSAGE OF THE LAW THAT ENDED
RACIAL SEGREGATION 1 (Robert D. Loevy ed., 1997) (describing the evolution of U.S. policy
from slavery to the Civil Rights Act of 1964).
The intent of Congress to transform the way that women were treated is not quite as
clear. Title VII was originally drafted to prohibit discrimination on the basis of race, color,
national origin, and religion, and as a last-minute amendment by a Southern Democrat, proposed
as a means to defeat the bill, sex was added to the list of prohibited classifications. 110 CONG.
REC. 2577–84 (1964), reprinted in LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF TITLES VII & XI OF CIVIL RIGHTS
ACT OF 1964, at 3213–28 (1968); see also RAYMOND F. GREGORY, WOMEN AND WORKPLACE
DISCRIMINATION: OVERCOMING BARRIERS TO GENDER EQUALITY 23–27 (2003) (describing the
overt discrimination of women in employment and the evolution of Title VII, but implying that
banning discrimination on the basis of sex was not really the goal of the statute). Even though the
proponent thought that the inclusion of sex would defeat the bill, Representative Martha Griffiths
(D. Mich.) urged liberal groups to support the amendment, reasoning that some conservatives
would vote for it because of its proponent, and she could persuade other members of Congress to
join in; thus Title VII may indeed have been intended to transform how society treated women.
MARY FRANCES BERRY, WHY ERA FAILED: POLITICS, WOMEN’S RIGHTS, AND THE AMENDING
PROCESS OF THE CONSTITUTION 61 (1986).
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their capital.150 They have a right not to have that capital taken away either
without due process or just compensation, and that property right includes a
right to use their capital in any way that does not infringe on another person’s
rights or strongly interfere with the public interest, something that also sounds
in liberty.151 The employment relationship is a use of capital, and the employer
decides who should receive payment, for what types of services, and under
what conditions. So, an employer deciding not to use capital to hire a
particular person, or to direct the use of capital to hire particular people, pay
them a certain amount, and dictate how their jobs should be performed all
seem to be part of the employer’s property or liberty rights.
At the same time, those rights are not absolute or unbounded. Moreover
the extent of those rights are defined by law. Congress has ongoing power to
declare particular uses of property impermissible as infringements on the rights
of others or as contravening the public interest. So to the extent that an
employer would be ordered not to engage in particular practices even as to a
particular individual from now on, there is no right that has been infringed
upon in a due process sense. Congress can prospectively define a property
right to exclude the prior practice—so long as it does not completely destroy
the value of the property, take title to real property, or physically take tangible
property, there is no constitutional problem.152 Thus, an agency award of
forward-looking relief, an order essentially for an employer to change behavior
in the future, likely would not need much oversight by an Article III court.
Declaring that a past action injured a person or violated public policy and
assessing a criminal penalty or damages seems more clearly to infringe on
liberty or property, though. Retrospective relief, relief that seeks to reach back

150. Employment statutes and cases ground regulation of employers in notions of property in
capital investment. They presume that employers retain the discretion to manage their businesses
and at least part of their business is in deciding whom to hire, what to have employees do, how
much to pay them, how to treat them, and how, when, and why to discharge them. See Richard
A. Epstein, In Defense of the Contract at Will, 51 U. CHI. L. REV. 947, 953–58 (1984) (grounding
the at-will presumption in principles of contract and property on broadly economic terms). Labor
cases, especially, demonstrate this underpinning. For example, “[T]he right of a person to sell his
labor upon such terms as he deems proper is, in its essence, the same as the right of the purchaser
of labor to prescribe the conditions upon which he will accept such labor from the person offering
to sell it.” NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 102 (1937).
In employment discrimination cases, the economic justification is embodied in the oftrepeated statement that courts do not sit as super-personnel boards, second guessing the
employer’s business decisions. See Charles A. Sullivan, Circling Back to the Obvious: The
Convergence of Traditional and Reverse Discrimination in Title VII Proof, 46 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1031, 1115–16 & n.337 (2004) (documenting the hundreds of cases that recite this general
principle).
151. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
152. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 538–40 (2005) (discussing when
regulatory action is deemed a taking for Fifth Amendment purposes).
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in time more clearly takes away an interest that had vested, in the property
sense, or penalizes conduct that was legal at the time, in a liberty sense. In a
property sense, the actor had a settled expectation at the time of action that this
direction of capital was a part of his or her property right. In a liberty sense,
the actor had no notice that his or her conduct would violate any law. Because
backward-looking relief likely does involve common law and constitutional
rights to property and liberty, for an agency to be able to order such relief, that
agency would likely need significant Article III oversight.
On the employee side, the issues are a little more ambiguous. Employees
are generally not seen to have property rights in future employment except in
very limited circumstances.153 Thus, where the action that was discriminatory
was refusing to hire, refusing to promote, demotion, or termination, the
employee’s property rights will likely be considered not to be affected. And
there has never been a liberty interest found in future work for a particular
employer.154
At the same time, discrimination is itself an injury to dignity at the least,
which is some form of property or liberty interest protected by the common
law and the Constitution,155 which suggests that employees in at least some
circumstances may also be able to claim a private rights interest. This may be
an especially strong claim in the context of government employers. First,
sometimes government employees, more often than private employees, have
property rights in their continued employment, created by contract or statute.156
And second, even where they do not have property rights, public employees
have substantive liberty (or equality) rights in not being subject to injury for
reasons that would violate the Constitution, like because of the employee’s
race or sex or in retaliation for engaging in First Amendment activity. Title

153. A contract will give an employee an enforceable property right or state law might. State
tenure laws for teachers or just cause civil service protections for government employees, for
example, create property rights. See, e.g., MO. REV. STAT. § 168.114 (2000) (outlining the causes
by which a permanent public school teacher can be terminated).
154. That is not to say that there is no liberty or privacy interest that an employer can injure—
those rights, like reputation, simply don’t extend to continued employment with this particular
employer.
155. See Jordan J. Paust, Human Dignity as a Constitutional Right: A Jurisprudential Based
Inquiry Into Criteria and Content, 27 HOW. L.J. 145, 158 (1984) (concluding that human dignity,
or its equivalent expression, is a fundamental constitutional right and legal principle).
156. PATRICIA H. WERHANE ET AL., EMPLOYMENT AND EMPLOYEE RIGHTS 54–55 (2004)
(noting that about fifty-five percent of private sector workers are at-will while government
employees generally have some job security); see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 599–600
(1972) (holding that a public employer may establish a property interest in continued employment
through its policies and practices); cf. Bd. of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577–78 (1972)
(holding that some process would be due an employee who had statutory tenure or a formal
contract of employment, both of which would give an employee a property right in continued
employment).
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VII protects many of these same rights in much the same way. Thus, to the
extent that Title VII overlaps with the Constitution and a discrimination claim
might implicate these rights, a private right of the public employee would
likely be at stake. Thus, for federal employees, even though Title VII claims
are currently adjudicated by an agency, that adjudication may not be
constitutional to the extent that the Title VII claims are really constitutional
claims. And, for state employees, even if the states consented to agency
adjudication, unconsenting employees likely could not be compelled to
participate without significant Article III oversight.
However, there is likely no private rights bar under the current state of the
law on the private employee side; absent our anti-discrimination laws, there is
no remedy for discrimination against private employers. In other words, there
is no enforceable right to be free from discrimination by private parties on the
basis of race, sex, national origin, religion, age, or disability founded in either
the common law or the Constitution. This dignitary, liberty, or property
interest has generally been protected only by statute.
Overall then, Title VII and the other employment discrimination statutes
do not fall perfectly into the public rights/private rights categories. They
involve both. Given that for at least some types of remedies, and some types
of parties, a private right might be at stake in adjudication of discrimination,
we turn next to the remedies currently available under Title VII to see how
much Article III oversight might be needed.
When it was enacting Title VII, Congress could have made a number of
different choices. It could have criminalized employment discrimination, but it
chose not to do that.157 It could have conditioned some sort of license to do
business on compliance with rules designed to prevent employment
discrimination, and an agency could have regulated the licensing process.158 It
could have given primary enforcement power to an agency, allowing no
private right of action at all. Conversely, it did not need to create an agency,
but instead could simply have given employees private rights of action along
with damages and other remedies, leaving to those private parties all
enforcement through litigation in state and federal courts. None of these
options would have posed constitutional problems.

157. Julie C. Suk suggests how the U.S. system might look if it had instead chosen to
criminalize employment discrimination, comparing Congress’ choice with the choice in France to
make employment discrimination a criminal issue. Julie C. Suk, Procedural Path Dependence:
Discrimination and the Civil-Criminal Divide, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1315 (2008).
158. Although states are generally the ones with the police power to require these types of
licenses, Congress would likely also have the power through the Commerce Clause. As long as
the business regulated had enough connection to interstate commerce, and given how loosely that
is defined, it is likely that every business does have some connection to interstate commerce, the
Commerce Clause would allow Congress to regulate it.
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The choice that Congress did make mixed many of these elements.
Congress created an agency to enforce the statute, the EEOC, but gave it very
limited powers.159 “Originally, the EEOC was empowered only to provide
technical assistance, to investigate, and to attempt conciliation; it could not
prosecute charges of discrimination and could not adopt substantive
interpretive regulations.”160 Individuals had a private right of action from the
start, however.161 And “[i]n 1972, the EEOC was given the power to prosecute
actions in federal court,” independent of any right of action the individual
employee might have, “in order to provide for more effective enforcement.”162
Additionally, coverage was extended to state and local governments.163
And the remedies were somewhat limited as well. The statute originally
allowed courts to order injunctive relief including instatement or reinstatement,
back pay, and “such [other] affirmative action as may be appropriate.”164 But
by creating a private right of action against employers, Congress created the
potential for private rights disputes, which would suggest that Article III courts
would have to have substantial oversight. Still, by limiting remedies to back
pay, reinstatement, and other forms of equitable remedies,165 Congress limited
the potential agency action to awarding only relief that would not infringe on
any vested rights to property or liberty, which made it possible that an agency
could act without Article III supervision. In other words, even though
employees had a private right of action against employers, something that
would likely implicate a private employer’s private right, a public employee’s
private right, or a state’s sovereignty interest, because the relief available was
159. See supra notes 99, 118–29 and accompanying text.
160. McCormick, supra note 91, at 202; see also id. at 202 n.52 (discussing the EEOC’s
enforcement powers).
161. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 706(e), 78 Stat. 241, 260 (1964)
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f) (2006)).
162. McCormick, supra note 91, at 202 (citing Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972,
Pub. L. No. 92-261, 86 Stat. 103; Statement about Signing the Equal Employment Opportunity
Act of 1972, PUB. PAPERS 105 (Mar. 25, 1972) (“Everyone familiar with the operation of title VII
over the past 7 years has realized that the promise of that historic legislation would remain
unfulfilled until some additional, broad-based enforcement machinery was created. This bill
provides that enforcement capability.”)). “The EEOC also has the power to adjudicate federal
claims, but not adjudicate private sector disputes.” McCormick, supra note 91, at 202 n.53.
163. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16c.
164. Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 706(g) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(g)).
165. It is unclear whether back pay is an equitable remedy or some kind of damages remedy.
Before compensatory damages were available, some argued that back pay was not equitable and
that jury trials had to be available for Title VII suits. Once the Civil Rights Act of 1991 made
compensatory and punitive damages, and also jury trials, available, those arguments were no
longer necessary. Most recently, the issue has again arisen in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131
S. Ct. 2541 (2011), where the issue is whether the plaintiff class by seeking back pay is seeking
only injunctive relief for class action certification purposes. See Transcript of Oral Argument at
18–21, Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541 (2011) (No. 10–277).
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only prospective, there was likely little constitutional problem with having a
federal agency adjudicate the claim with little Article III oversight.
Additionally, by allowing the Attorney General, and later the EEOC, to
pursue civil cases of individual or “pattern or practice” discrimination on
behalf of the government, for which equitable relief could be awarded,166
Congress established a system of public rights as between employers and the
government. And so, from the start, Congress could have designed the EEOC
to adjudicate claims of discrimination, at least those brought by the
government as prosecutor, and likely even those brought by employees
because of the only available remedy, as long as there was some way to review
the decision in an Article III court.
In 1991, Congress amended Title VII to allow for damages to be
awarded.167 When it did that, it may have foreclosed the possibility that it
could have an agency adjudicate any discrimination claims seeking damages
on behalf of an employee. A declaration of liability for past conduct and
retrospective relief would most likely infringe on an employer’s private right,
and suits for money damages would implicate state sovereignty rights.
Analysis of the nature of right at stake or the type of remedy available tells
us only that some Article III oversight is necessary; it does not determine the
level of Article III oversight necessary. We still must look to the courts’
structural interests. Structural interests are evaluated by gauging the level of
infringement on the ordinary work of the federal courts.168 We look primarily
at the scope of the subject-matter jurisdiction of the proposed agency for this
analysis. On the one hand, the jurisdiction might seem to be fairly narrow—
simply violations of federal antidiscrimination laws.
However, the subject of employment discrimination is not nearly as
narrow, nor the workplace nearly as regulated, as was the situation in either
Thomas or Schor. In both situations, there was no background right to engage
in the conduct the regulated parties had engaged in.169 Congress had created
barriers to enter into the field at all. The workplace is not like that. Anyone
can become an employer simply by paying another for a service. And there are
very few limits on that transaction. Moreover, the background rule of at-will
employment, that an employer can refuse to hire or fire a person for a good
reason, a bad reason, or no reason at all, means that this exception is actually
incredibly narrow. And other workplace laws, like wage and hour laws,
workplace safety laws, collective bargaining laws, and employee benefits taxes

166. This power was transferred to the EEOC by the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of
1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 5, 86 Stat. 103, 107 (codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000e-6(e)).
167. Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 102, 105 Stat. 1071, 1072–73 (codified
as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1981a).
168. See supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text.
169. See supra notes 56–59, 72–74 and accompanying text.
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and laws do not regulate how an employer may employ someone in such a
comprehensive sense that they consist of barriers to entry into the field of
employment. Moreover, discrimination claims often overlap with claims under
other statutes or common law contract or tort remedies.
Thus, there seems to be more of an encroachment on the regular work of
the judicial branch than in the cases in which the Supreme Court has upheld
the use of non-judicial actors with little Article III oversight.170 At the same
time, though, barring giving the new agency jurisdiction over state common
law claims that might be related to the adverse employment action, like
intentional infliction of emotional distress, discharge in violation of public
policy, or breach of contract, the subject-matter jurisdiction is substantially
more narrow than that of the Bankruptcy Courts invalidated by the Court in
Northern Pipeline.171 And if the structural interest in the subject matter is
gauged by the federal courts’ interest in the kinds of cases at stake,172 federal
courts seem to have very little interest in discrimination cases.173 Likely, the
jurisdiction would be considered narrow enough not to infringe too far on the
structural interests of the federal courts.
One last consideration is mandated by the Supreme Court’s Article I cases:
the individual interest in having private rights adjudicated by an Article III
court. If the adjudication would implicate a private right at all, the individual
has some right of access to Article III courts.174 Likely this individual interest
in access to an Article III court would be implicated enough that at the very
least, consent by all private and all state employers subject to actions for
damages and by government employees in all cases would be necessary.
And so what does this mean for design for the agency? Making the
process optional would be one way to comply with Article III. It is likely that
making the process optional will mean that it is never used, however.
Employers have little incentive to agree to have a claim considered by an

170. See supra Part I.A.
171. See supra notes 50–52 and accompanying text.
172. I draw on Grable & Sons Metal Products, Inc. v. Darue Engineering & Manufacturing,
545 U.S. 308 (2005) and Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals Inc. v. Thompson, 478 U.S. 804 (1986)
for an analogy here. Both of those cases concerned when a state-created cause of action might be
considered to arise under federal law for purposes of statutory federal question jurisdiction.
Grable, 545 U.S. at 310; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at 805. Part of the test is how important the
federal interest at issue is, and that is gauged in part, it seems, by how much the federal courts
would be interested in that type of case. See Grable, 545 U.S. at 315; Merrell Dow, 478 U.S. at
814–16, 814 n.12.
173. See Scott A. Moss, Judicial Hostility to Litigation and How It Impairs Legal
Accountability for Corporations and Other Defendants, AM. CONST. SOC’Y 3–10 (May 2010),
http://www.acslaw.org/sites/default/files/ACS%20Issue%20Brief%20-%20Moss%20Judicial%20
Hostility.pdf (discussing the procedural hurdles facing discrimination plaintiffs).
174. See supra notes 27–30.
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agency when the courts so frequently rule in their favor.175 Agency
proceedings will be less expensive, but that does not, by itself, appear to be
enough incentive. The EEOC for some time has been promoting its mediation
program.176 It has had great difficulty getting employers to participate,
however, because they see little validity in the employee’s complaint and
believe that they have little to lose by refusing.177 If they refuse, the chances
that the employee will sue are very small, and so even the prospect of legal
fees is not enough to justify the expense of the agency proceedings.
Additionally, even if an employee does sue, the chances of the employee
surviving a motion to dismiss or summary judgment are very small, and of
surviving appeal if they win, also small.178
At this point, a reader might be wondering why the answer is not simply to
provide for extensive judicial review. Ways to do that might be to make it
more like the process of the National Labor Relations Board, in that the
agency’s order in favor of an employee would not be self-executing.179
Employees would have to seek payment of damages or issuance of an
injunction in federal court based on the agency’s factual findings and
recommendations. For findings in which private employers were found not to
have discriminated, there might need to be little Article III oversight. As an
alternative to the enforcement proceeding, perhaps, employees could seek
judicial review of the agency’s decision in federal court, and employers could
seek review rather than comply if they were found to have discriminated. That
review might be very searching, considering the matter de novo. If the review
route were taken or if the employer failed to comply with the recommendations
without seeking review, either the agency or the employee would be able to go
to court to seek sanctions for that failure to comply.
That extensive judicial review would seem to eviscerate most of the
reasons to create an agency adjudicator in the first place. The proceedings will
be more efficient and less costly (at least for the courts) if Article III judges are
not overseeing the process of managing discovery, taking evidence, and
mediating pre-trial motions. However the courts will still have many cases to
decide if review is practically automatic. Additionally, to the extent that the
process seeks to harness the expertise of the decision maker or more clearly set
norms, if the courts have free reign, and don’t agree with the agency’s views of

175. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
176. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
177. E. Patrick McDermott et al., An Investigation of the Reasons for the Lack of Employer
Participation in the EEOC Mediation Program, EEOC, http://www.eeoc.gov/mediate/study3/in
dex.html (last modified Dec. 10, 2003).
178. See supra note 104 and accompanying text.
179. NLRB v. P*I*E Nationwide, Inc., 894 F.2d 887, 890 (7th Cir. 1990).
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the norm (much like the current climate with the EEOC), then the agency
won’t be able to serve that function.
Another solution that would not suffer from either weakness might be to
change the system entirely to be more like workers’ compensation insurance.
Discrimination has been likened to a dangerous condition on land,180 and so
perhaps that analogy is useful. If discrimination is likely, perhaps employers
should have to pay into a sort of discrimination insurance fund. The amounts
due the fund would be determined by an agency based on findings of
discrimination—the more discrimination claims that are found to be valid per
employee, the higher the contribution required per employee. Employees who
believed they had been discriminated against could apply to the fund, and the
agency would determine whether they had, and how much they were due as a
result, paying from the fund. Perhaps for particularly egregious instances, the
employer would also be subject to civil fines, which would go into the fund.
This system, at least in the private sector would appear to avoid the private
right problem entirely.
The problem with this system is that the structural changes that injunctive
relief could provide would have to be provided for in some separate process.
Orders for structural change that are closely monitored appear to be the most
effective means of eliminating discrimination and transforming workplace
norms,181 so this could be a big loss of efficiency in accomplishing that
function of the employment discrimination laws. However, that may be offset
by a gain prompted by removing some of the stigma of what it means to
discriminate. Workers’ compensation is in some sense a no-fault system.182
Accidents happen. Much of the current debate about discrimination is whether
implicit bias, the biases that we all have and that are exercised sometimes
below the level of fully-self aware consciousness, should be the kind of
discrimination made illegal by the employment discrimination laws. Being a
discriminator carries a huge stigma, which is part of the reason that people
resist admitting that they might discriminate. Removing fault for at least this
kind of discrimination might lessen the stigma in a way that would allow
people to reflect on their implicit biases. And it could do so in a way that
would still acknowledge that the person discriminated against was harmed and
would provide a remedy for that harm.
Another way to divide the adjudication is to focus on the type of remedy.
Perhaps the agency’s order regarding liability and awarding equitable relief
would be self-executing, but any damages portion would have to be brought to

180. Marc R. Poirier, Is Cognitive Bias at Work a Dangerous Condition on Land?, 7 EMP.
RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 459, 464 (2003).
181. Levit, supra note 97, at 427.
182. See Howard Delivery Serv., Inc., v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 547 U.S. 651, 655 (2006)
(describing workers’ compensation as a no-fault policy).
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a federal court for enforcement. That too would likely not involve any private
right being finally adjudicated by the agency and would also limit the scope of
review the federal courts could exercise over much of the decision. But again,
we would lose a significant amount of the efficiency gains of bringing the
claims together in one action.
CONCLUSION
Article III is not the only potential constitutional barrier to agency
adjudication. Other constitutional provisions would have to be considered as
well. Due process is likely not a problem as long as the agency process
provides for notice, an opportunity to be heard, and minimizes the risk of
erroneous deprivation.183 In theory, there might at some point be a substantive
due process or equal protection problem with carving out particular claims or
claims of suspect classes for special treatment, although the courts have not yet
confronted that issue. Additionally, if the agency awards damages, the
Seventh Amendment will likely be implicated.184 But for the most part, these
issues will likely be approached as a matter of balancing with a threshold
consent requirement analogous to the balancing that the article III analysis
requires us to engage in.
For most of the types of regulatory reform that are on our national agenda
for which adjudication will seem a possible regulatory solution, it is likely that
some form of private right will be at stake. While there will likely be no
absolute bar, then, to the use of adjudication, the key will be to create enough
incentive for parties to consent to the system’s use, or to rethink the regulatory
system more broadly to restructure what might be considered private rights
into a more clearly public rights framework. This paper begins to outline ways
that might be done.

183. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333–35 (1976) (using a balancing test to
evaluate what process is due in connection with a deprivation of a public right); Goldberg v.
Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262–66 (1970) (using a balancing test to determine whether certain
procedural protections were required before welfare benefits could be terminated even with
administrative review afterwards).
184. See Granfinanciera, S. A. v. Nordberg, 492 U.S. 33, 51–55 (1989). The question of
whether a jury is governed by the same public right/private right distinction as used in Article III,
but the scope appears a bit broader, focusing on the distinction between legal and equitable
proceedings. In Granfinanciera, the Court reserved the question of whether, a jury trial being
required, a non–Article III decision maker could oversee such a jury trial. Id. at 64. That
question remains unresolved. See, e.g., In re Grabill Corp., 967 F.2d 1152, 1158 (7th Cir. 1992)
(holding bankruptcy courts do not have the power to conduct jury trials); In re Ben Cooper, Inc.,
896 F.2d 1394, 1403–04 (2d Cir.) (holding bankruptcy courts do have the power to conduct jury
trials), vacated sub. nom., Ins. Co. of Pa. v. Ben Cooper, Inc., 498 U.S. 964 (1990) (per curiam),
reinstated on remand, 924 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1991).
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